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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this article is to show how Thorstein Veblen understood and applied Darwinian 
principles to his analysis of the evolution of socio-economic institutions. At the core of 
Darwinism is a commitment to causal explanation, which Veblen adopted while not 
undermining his appreciation of the distinctively purposeful nature of human action. In 
addition, Veblen knowingly applied the Darwinian principles of variation, inheritance and 
selection to institutional evolution. However, despite his achievement, he did not develop an 
adequate or systematic theory in this area. Nevertheless, he provided a foundation upon which 
modern Darwinian theories of socio-economic evolution can build. 
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Thorstein Veblen and Darwinism 
Geoffrey M. Hodgson1 
Thorstein Veblen repeatedly proclaimed the need for a „post-Darwinian‟ economics and saw 
his own work as a contribution to this endeavour. Remarkably, however, the Darwinian aspect 
of Veblenian thinking was largely neglected, both by later commentators and by the tradition 
of American institutionalism that Veblen inspired (Hodgson, 2003, 2004). Veblen was widely 
admired, but his frequent Darwinian injunctions were rarely followed in detail. The aim of the 
present paper is to explore the manner and extent of Veblen‟s use of Darwinian ideas in his 
evolutionary and institutional economics. 
This paper is organized in six sections. The first section outlines the fundamental features 
of Darwinism that are relevant for social as well as biological evolution. The second section 
discusses how Veblen replicated and adopted Darwinian notions of causality in his writing. 
The third section deals with some misunderstandings concerning Veblen‟s treatment of the 
concept of intentionality, and its relation to his Darwinism. The fourth and fifth sections 
address Veblen‟s application of the Darwinian principles of variation, inheritance and 
selection to the evolution of institutions. The final section concludes the essay, by assessing 
Veblen‟s omissions and achievements in this area. 
1. What is Darwinism? 
A host of misunderstandings surround the question of Darwinism and its relation with the 
social sciences. Contrary to widespread suppositions, Darwinism neither connotes any form of 
racism, sexism, nationalism or imperialism nor does it provide any moral justification for „the 
survival of the fittest‟. Furthermore, Darwinism does not imply that militant conflict is 
inevitable, that human inequalities or power or wealth are inevitable, that cooperation or 
altruism are unimportant or unnatural, that evolution always leads to optimization or progress, 
that social phenomena can or should be explained in terms of biology alone, that organisms 
can or should be explained in terms of their genes alone, that human intention is unimportant, 
or that human agency is blind or mechanistic. 
Humans differ from plants and most animals, in that they have language and culture. We 
prefigure many actions and consequences in our minds, and act intentionally. The 
mechanisms of human socio-economic evolution and biotic evolution are very different. In 
studying socio-economic evolution we are concerned with human welfare and well-being, and 
not merely with survival or fecundity. All that is vitally important. But it does not diminish 
the importance or analytical value of Darwinism one iota. 
                                                 
1 This paper makes use of material from Hodgson (2003, 2004). The author thanks participants at the November 
2003 Bevagna seminar for comments and discussions. 
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Above all, Darwinism means causal explanation, where a cause is understood as 
necessarily involving transfers of matter or energy. Divine, spiritual, miraculous or uncaused 
causes are ruled out. Explanations of outcomes are in terms of connected causal sequences, 
based on the presupposition that every event or phenomenon has a cause. As the institutional 
economist Albert Wolfe (1924, p. 465) put it: „All science must … rest on the faith that 
nothing happens without a cause and that every cause has an effect.‟ This applies to human 
intentionality as well as everything else. Contrary to widespread belief, causal explanation 
does not mean that intentions are ignored in Darwinism; it simply means that they are caused, 
and they have to be explained. Also contrary to common belief, the commitment to the idea 
that every event or phenomenon has a cause does not imply that every event is predictable, or 
event regularities are pervasive, or that the universe is a Parmenidean block or a machine. The 
principle of causal determination is not the same as determinism, as it is often defined (Bunge, 
1959; Hodgson, 2001b, 2004). 
Charles Darwin died decades before the idea of a gene was formulated and before the 
incorporation of Mendelian genetics into biology. Without relevant knowledge of the 
mechanisms of reproduction, Darwin did not rule out the possibility of the Lamarckian 
inheritance of acquired characters. 
The importance and enduring value of Darwinism is its elaboration of a causal mechanism 
of evolution involving variation, inheritance and selection. In principle, this mechanism could 
apply to any open and evolving system with a variety of units. Darwinian evolution occurs 
when there is some replicating entity that makes imperfect copies of itself, and these copies 
do not have equal potential to survive. 
Darwin (1859, 422-3; 1871, vol. 1, 59-61) himself conjectured that natural selection 
operates upon the elements of human language as well as on individual organisms. Darwin 
(1871, vol. 1, 166) also argued that tribal groups with propensities that served the common 
good would be favored by “natural selection”. Hence Darwin seemed to endorse a version of 
the natural selection of groups, as well as the natural selection of individuals. Several modern 
Darwinian biologists have argued that evolutionary selection occurs at higher levels: not 
simply on genes, but on individuals, groups and even species.2 
The core ideas of Darwinism were not widely understood in the decades after 1859 
(Bowler, 1988) and they are still misunderstood by many today. Darwin was more widely 
associated with the proposition that humankind is descended from apes, rather than with his 
particular causal evolutionary mechanism. 
Nevertheless, a small number of astute thinkers followed Darwin; to consider the possibility 
that Darwinian mechanisms – in the general sense described above – might also apply to the 
evolution of societies, cultures and ideas. Walter Bagehot (1872) wrote of inheritance and 
natural selection in the social and political sphere. William James (1880, p. 441) opened a 
path-breaking essay with the observation of a “remarkable parallel … between the facts of 
social evolution on the one hand, and of zoölogical evolution as expounded by Mr. Darwin on 
the other.” Subsequently Samuel Alexander (1892) and Benjamin Kidd (1894) wrote on the 
natural selection of ethical principles. Finally, and in the most sophisticated presentation so 
far, David Ritchie (1896, p. 171) considered “a „natural selection‟ of ideas, customs, 
                                                 
2 See, for example, Brandon and Burian (1984), Eldredge (1985), and Sober and Wilson (1998). 
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institutions, irrespective of the natural selection of individuals and of races.” The scene was 
set for Veblen‟s crucial innovations.3 
2. Veblen’s Darwinian Emphasis on Causation 
This section summarizes the way in which Veblen applied Darwinian ideas to economics. 
First, Veblen understood and endorsed the principles of causality that were fundamental to 
Darwinism. For Veblen, the Darwinian rejection of teleology became the necessary basis of a 
scientific and „post-Darwinian‟ approach to economics and social science. There is abundant 
evidence that Veblen understood Darwinism most fundamentally in terms of a commitment to 
detailed and sequential causal analysis. For example, Veblen (1898a, pp. 375-8) wrote: 
Any evolutionary science … is a close-knit body of theory. It is a theory of a process, of 
an unfolding sequence … of cumulative causation. The great deserts of the evolutionist 
leaders ... lie ... in their having shown how this colorless impersonal sequence of cause 
and effect can be made use of for theory proper, by virtue of its cumulative character. 
This insistence on explanation in terms of a cumulative causal sequence was repeated in 
several works (Veblen, 1898a, pp. 381, 384, 386; 1900, p. 266; 1904, pp. 67, 313, 314, 365). 
Although Darwin himself did not use the term „cumulative causation‟, it is important to 
underline the way that Veblen (1904, p. 370) saw it as linked with Darwinism: 
His [Darwin‟s] inquiry characteristically confines itself to the process of cumulative 
change. His results, as well as his specific determination of the factors at work in this 
process of cumulative change, have been questioned; perhaps they are open to all the 
criticisms levelled against them as well as a few more not thought of; but the scope and 
method given to scientific enquiry by Darwin and the generation whose spokesman he is 
has substantially not been questioned, except by that diminishing contingent of the 
faithful … 
Veblen (1907, p. 304) also wrote that 
in the Darwinian scheme of thought, the continuity sought in and imputed to the facts is a 
continuity of cause and effect. It is a scheme of blindly cumulative causation, in which 
there is no trend, no final term, no consummation. The sequence is controlled by nothing 
but the vis a tergo of brute causation, and is essentially mechanical. 
The ambiguous words „blindly‟ and „mechanical‟ in the above quotation might cause some 
confusion. There is no warrant for assuming that for Veblen they meant a lack of individual 
purpose or will, but they could encourage such a misinterpretation. Veblen must be criticized 
for using such terms, at least in an unqualified manner. Nevertheless, his key point of 
emphasis was one of causal sequence. Veblen (1919, p. 37) visited this theme persistently, as 
in these words originally published in 1908: 
The characteristic feature by which post-Darwinian science is contrasted with what went 
before is a new distribution of emphasis, whereby the process of causation, the interval of 
                                                 
3 The idea of extending the range of Darwinian principles outside the biological sphere was later described by 
Dawkins (1983) and Dennett (1995) as „Universal Darwinism‟. Previously, Campbell (1965) had also developed 
the idea of a generalized Darwinism. Note, however, that the Dawkins-Dennett version sees the social unit of 
selection as the „meme‟, while Veblen in contrast emphasized the selection of individual habits and social 
institutions. 
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instability and transition between initial cause and definitive effect, has come to take the 
first place in the inquiry; instead of that consummation in which causal effect was once 
presumed to come to rest. This change in point of view was, of course, not abrupt or 
catastrophic. But it has latterly gone so far that modern science is becoming substantially 
a theory of the process of consecutive change, realized to be self-continuing or self-
propagating and to have no final term. 
In the same year Veblen (1908, p. 159 n.) wrote of „the field of cumulative change within 
which the modern post-Darwinian sciences live and move and have their being.‟ A few 
commentators on Veblen have recognized this crucial Darwinian focus on causal processes in 
Veblen‟s writings. As Karl Anderson (1933, p. 602) put it, modern science for Veblen 
„demands an explanation of things in terms of cause and effect, and postulates that the causal 
relationship has neither starting-point nor stopping-point but runs in an endless sequence.‟ 
Similarly, Idus Murphree (1959, p. 312) remarked that Veblen „thought of the Darwinian 
method as one that revealed the impersonal sequence of mechanical cause and effect and 
dispensed with a search for universal purposes and belief in a “natural order”.‟ 
Veblen and others sometimes described this emphasis on detailed, step-by-step causal 
explanation as part of the „genetic‟ method. Veblen (1903, p. 655) explained the „genetic‟ 
method of „modern science‟ as applied to social phenomena: 
This method is the genetic one, which deals with the forces and sequence of development 
and seeks to understand the outcome by finding how and why it has come about. The aim 
is to organize social phenomena into a theoretical structure in causal terms. 
The term „genetic‟ like „genesis‟ refers to causal origin or determination.4 The word „genetic‟ 
had been widely used in methodological or scientific contexts in the nineteenth century, and it 
should not be confused with the modern biological term „gene‟. The „gene‟ concept was first 
introduced into biology in 1909 by Wilhelm Johannsen. It would thus be an appalling error to 
interpret Veblen‟s use of the term „genetic‟ as an accommodation to genetic reductionism! 
In Veblen‟s writing there was the same emphasis on the detailed and processual nature of 
Darwinian evolution as in the modern work of Daniel Dennett (1995). Although Veblen did 
not use the word, he had as much appreciation as Dennett of the nature of Darwinian 
evolution as an „algorithmic‟ process. Veblen used phrases such as „genetic theory‟, 
„cumulative causation‟, „theory of a process, of an unfolding sequence‟ and „impersonal 
sequence of cause and effect‟ to connote the same idea. This Darwinian focus on algorithmic 
processes is both revolutionary and highly modern; it directs attention to ongoing processes 
rather than static equilibria alone.5 
                                                 
4 The German term genetisch also alludes to origins and is found in the in the eighteenth-century writings of 
Herder and Schiller. Apparently, the word „genetic‟ in this same general (and not particularly biological) sense 
was introduced into English by Carlyle (Hayek, 1988, p. 147). 
5 However, the differences between Dennett and Veblen should not be overlooked. For example, Dennett‟s 
(1995) devotion to the vague concept of the „meme‟ as the unit of cultural evolution contrasts with Veblen‟s 
pragmatist insistence on habit as the basis of ideas and essence of culture and his emphasis on emergent 
institutions as units of selection. One of the problems with „memetics‟ is that the causes of meme replication are 
unexplained, while Veblen explained the replication of institutions in terms of the psychological mechanisms of 
individual habit formation. Furthermore, Veblen‟s (1909a, p. 300) strictures against reductionism have no 
adequate parallel in Dennett (1995). 
 - 5 - 
However, while Veblen coined the term „cumulative‟ causation, he used it primarily to refer 
to cumulative sequences of cause and effect.6 With other authors, the term „cumulative 
causation‟ took on the different meaning (in modern parlance) of non-linear processes of 
positive feedback. For instance, in his classic article on „increasing returns‟ Allyn Young 
(1928, p. 533) wrote that: „change becomes progressive and propagates itself in a cumulative 
way‟. One of his students was Nicholas Kaldor (1985), who made extensive use of Young‟s 
positive-feedback notion of „cumulative causation‟. Gunnar Myrdal (1939, 1957) 
independently took the idea of cumulative causation from the positive feedback mechanisms 
in the monetary economics of fellow Swedish economist Knut Wicksell. 
Veblen used the idea of an unbroken historical chain of cause and effect to undermine the 
presuppositions of mainstream economics. His use of Darwinian methodological injunctions 
led to a powerful critique. Ultimately, because the human agent was a subject of an 
evolutionary process, he or she could not be taken as fixed or given. A causal account of the 
interaction between the individual and social structure had to be provided. This causal account 
should not stop with the individual, but it should also attempt to explain the origin of 
psychological purposes and preferences. 
Veblen argued that a problem with mainstream economics was that it provided a causal and 
evolutionary explanation neither of „rational economic man‟ nor of his given preference 
function (Argyrous and Sethi, 1996; Hodgson, 1998). How did such rationality and 
preferences appear in human evolution? What causes and processes brought them into being? 
How and when are they formed in the development of each human individual? For Veblen, 
such an escape from evolutionary principles was impossible. Darwinism meant not only a 
critique of Divine intervention, but it also required a rejection of immanently conceived 
preference functions. As a result, the universal assumption in neoclassical economics „of a 
passive and substantially inert and immutably given human nature‟ (Veblen, 1898b, p. 389) 
had to be criticized. 
Veblen upheld that utilitarian and hedonistic explanations of human behaviour were 
inadequate because they did not encompass an evolutionary and causal explanation of the 
origin of the assumed behavioural characteristics. The neoclassical assumption of given 
preferences side-steps an explanation of the origin and initial acquisition of those preferences. 
The assumption that individuals are selfish requires an explanation of the evolution of 
selfishness. In general, postulates about human behaviour at the socio-economic level 
themselves require explanation in evolutionary terms. 
3. Veblen on Intentionality and Causality 
Veblen attempted to reconcile the reality of human will and intentionality with science and 
causal explanations. In his first published article of 1884, Veblen (1934, p. 175) noted the 
contradiction between „freedom of the person‟ in Kant‟s Critique of Practical Reason and „the 
notion of strict determinism‟ found in his Critique of Pure Reason. Veblen saw in Kant the 
idea that „in order to free activity, a mediation between the two was likewise indispensable.‟ 
Veblen‟s subsequent writing also involved an attempt to mediate between „freedom‟ and 
„determinism‟, but one that was consistent with Darwinian principles. Veblen neither denied 
nor underestimated the significance of human intentionality, but saw it as a result of 
                                                 
6 A possible exception is where Veblen (1904, p. 368) wrote of „complex‟ processes „in which any appreciable 
deviation may forthwith count in a cumulative manner‟. 
 - 6 - 
evolution. Darwin rejected religious and teleological explanations of origin or destiny. Veblen 
rejected them too, while attempting to leave an intermediate place for „teleology‟ in human 
purposeful behaviour. He retained the idea that persons were purposeful, but Veblen (1898c, 
pp. 188-93) placed this proposition within an evolutionary framework: 
Like other animals, man is an agent that acts in response to stimuli afforded by the 
environment in which he lives. Like other species, he is a creature of habit and 
propensity. But in a higher degree than other species, man mentally digests the content of 
habits under whose guidance he acts, and appreciates the trend of these habits and 
propensities. ... By selective necessity he is endowed with a proclivity for purposeful 
action. ... He acts under the guidance of propensities which have been imposed upon him 
by the process of selection to which he owes his differentiation from other species. 
Hence Veblen followed Darwin and regarded human intentionality as a capacity that had itself 
evolved through natural selection. As Veblen (1899a, p. 15) put it in another work, the 
capacity of humankind to act with deliberation towards ends was itself a result of natural 
selection: 
As a matter of selective necessity, man is an agent. He is, in his own apprehension, a 
centre of unfolding impulsive activity – „teleological‟ activity. He is an agent seeking in 
every act the accomplishment of some concrete, objective, impersonal end. 
Despite this, Veblen is widely misunderstood as underestimating the actuality or significance 
of human intentionality and purposefulness. On the contrary, Veblen (1898b, p. 391) insisted: 
„Economic action is teleological, in the sense that men always and everywhere seek to do 
something.‟ The fact that such purposeful behaviour itself emerged through evolutionary 
selection does not mean a denial of the reality of purposeful behaviour. Instead, Veblen 
consistently tried to reconcile a notion of individual purposefulness (or sufficient reason) with 
his materialist idea of causality (or efficient cause). 
Intentions can themselves be causes, but intentions are always caused. The evolution of 
human intentionality, and its development within each human being, has to be explained in 
terms of materialist causes and evolutionary selection. As noted above, this is an aspect of the 
Darwinian commitment to causal explanation. Like Darwin, T. H. Huxley, G. H. Lewes and 
C. L. Morgan, Veblen rejected a dualist or Cartesian ontology that separated intentionality 
completely from matter and materialist causality. Veblen (1909b, pp. 624-5) saw such a 
dualism as unacceptable for the following reason: 
The two methods of inference – from sufficient reason [or intention] and from efficient 
[or materialist] cause – are out of touch with one another and there is no transition from 
one to the other: no method of converting the procedure or the results of the one into 
those of the other.  
Others since have echoed Veblen‟s argument against the idea of separate types of cause, and 
against the related Cartesian dualism of matter and mind. For example, Barry Hindess (1989, 
p. 150) asked pertinently: „If human action is subject to two distinct modes of determination, 
what happens when they conflict, when intentionality pushes one way and causality pushes 
another?‟ We do not and cannot know the answer, because to reach it would involve the 
reconciliation of irreconcilables. John Searle (1997, pp. xii-xiii) similarly remarked: „dualism 
... seems a hopeless theory because, having made a strict distinction between the mental and 
the physical, it cannot make the relation of the two intelligible.‟ Mario Bunge (1980, p. 20) 
put it in a nutshell: „Dualism is inconsistent with the ontology of science.‟ 
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Veblen perceived the consequences for the social sciences of this mistaken dualism. For 
example: „The immediate consequence is that the resulting economic theory is of a 
teleological character – “deductive” or “a priori” as it is often called – instead of being drawn 
in terms of cause and effect‟ (Veblen, 1909b, p. 625). His solution, following Darwin, was to 
place human intentionality in an evolutionary context. At least in principle, consciousness had 
to be explained in Darwinian and evolutionary terms. As Veblen (1906, p. 589) alluded: 
„While knowledge is construed in teleological terms, in terms of personal interest and 
attention, this teleological aptitude is itself reducible to a product of unteleological natural 
selection.‟ In the following passage, Veblen (1909b, p. 625) explained in more detail: 
The modern scheme of knowledge, on the whole, rests, for its definitive ground, on the 
relation of cause and effect; the relation of sufficient reason [or intention] being admitted 
only provisionally and as a proximate factor in that analysis, always with the 
unambiguous reservation that the analysis must ultimately come to rest in terms of cause 
and effect. 
But this does mean that intentionality (or sufficient reason) is nonexistent or unimportant. On 
the contrary, Veblen (1909b, p. 625) acknowledged „that the relation of sufficient reason 
enters very substantially into human conduct. It is this element of discriminating forethought 
that distinguishes human conduct from brute behavior.‟ Veblen (1909b, p. 626) then went on 
to observe and approve that „modern science at large has made the causal relation the sole 
ultimate ground of theoretical formulation‟. Veblen saw „the relation of sufficient reason as a 
proximate, supplementary, or intermediate ground, subsidiary, and subservient to the 
argument from cause to effect.‟ 
In sum, while human intentionality is real and consequential, and a necessary element in 
any causal explanation in the social sciences, intentions themselves had at some time to be 
explained. As Veblen (1909b, p. 626) put it, explanation could not be confined to the 
„rationalistic, teleological terms of calculation and choice‟ because the psychological beliefs 
and mechanisms that lay behind deliberation and preferences had also to be explained in 
terms of a „sequence of cause and effect, by force of such elements as habituation and 
conventional requirements.‟ By acknowledging the need for such causal explanations, Veblen 
rejected both the assumption of the given individual in neoclassical economics and the 
opposite error of regarding human agency as entirely an outcome of mysterious social forces. 
As well as to Darwin, Veblen‟s treatment of intentionality owed a great deal to the then 
emerging tradition of American pragmatism. Hans Joas (1996, p. 158) succinctly summarized 
the pragmatist contribution in this area: 
The alternative to a teleological interpretation of action, with its inherent dependence on 
Cartesian dualisms, is to conceive of perception and cognition not as preceding action but 
rather as a phase of action by which action is directed and redirected in its situational 
contexts. According to this alternative view, goal-setting does not take place by an act of 
intellect prior to the actual action, but is instead the result of a reflection on aspirations 
and tendencies that are pre-reflexive and have already always been operative. In this act 
of reflection, we thematize aspirations which are normally at work without our being 
actively aware of them. But where exactly are these aspirations located? They are located 
in our bodies. It is the body‟s capabilities, habits and ways of relating to its environment 
which form the background to all conscious goal-setting, in other words, to our 
intentionality. Intentionality itself, then, consists in a self-reflective control which we 
exercise over our current behavior. 
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Although Veblen rarely spelt out such matters in sufficient detail, I submit that this pragmatist 
conception of action is entirely consistent with his own expressed views, and its adoption is 
explicable in terms of his knowledge of the ideas of Charles Sanders Peirce, William James 
and John Dewey. In this pragmatist view, intentionality is not denied but placed in the context 
of habits of thought and behaviour. 
Veblen‟s position on intentionality has been the subject of some misunderstanding. John R. 
Commons (1924, p. 376) referred to „the natural selection stage of blind evolution that 
followed Darwin, whose distinguished exponent in economics is Veblen. The theorists of 
each stage attempted to get rid of the human will and to explain economic phenomena as the 
working out of natural forces.‟ This assessment replicates the misunderstanding that 
Darwinism necessarily excludes intentionality or will. 
David Seckler (1975, p. 56) came to the verdict that Veblen „teeters between free will and 
determinism‟. But Seckler did not define these terms adequately. Sure enough, Veblen can be 
criticized for sometimes describing a Darwinian causal process as „mechanical‟. This can give 
the impression that intentionality or purposefulness is excluded. But Veblen acknowledged 
the reality of purposeful behaviour. While Seckler (1975, p. 86) accepted the „methodological 
dualism‟ of Ludwig von Mises (1949) and others, Veblen (1898b, p. 386) argued in contrast 
that the dualist position of the Austrian school should be dissolved by bringing purposes and 
preferences within the orbit of scientific explanation. What Seckler failed to understand was 
that Veblen was trying to overcome the problems of dualism. Veblen was not trying to 
dispense with human will but to reconcile it with materialist causality. Admittedly, Veblen 
was not entirely successful in formulating this position. But Veblen‟s shortcomings are no 
excuse for ignoring his efforts in that direction. 
Richard Langlois (1986, p. 4) alleged that Veblen „wished to rid economics of any sort of 
human intelligence and purpose.‟ Similarly, in an incisive essay on Veblen, Malcolm 
Rutherford (1998, pp. 475-6) saw problems emanating from Veblen‟s non-teleological notion 
of explanation in the social sciences: 
Following Darwin, [Veblen] sought an evolutionary theory that was free from teleology 
and ran in purely causal terms. He was aware that individuals acted in a goal-directed 
manner, but he wanted to present institutional change as unintended result – as a result of 
a causal process that did not rely on intentionality or on the appraisal of one institutional 
scheme as compared to another. 
Rutherford is one of the best interpreters of Veblen, and Langlois is an incisive theorist. But 
both writers distort Veblen‟s position here. Neither Veblen nor Darwin dismissed 
intentionality, but saw teleological or goal-directed behaviour as explicable in causal terms. 
Contrary to Rutherford, Veblen‟s explanation of action and institutional change did involve 
intentionality. It should be clear from the quotations above that Veblen saw intentionality as 
part of the explanation of institutional change. Veblen recognized purposeful behaviour but 
saw it as ultimately explicable in causal terms. 
Veblen outlined the problem of reconciling human volition and causality but failed to 
develop an adequate and non-reductionist philosophical framework in which human 
intentionality, monism and causality could be reconciled; without reducing mind to matter, or 
matter to mind. In retrospect, a missing conceptual tool was an explicit and developed concept 
of emergence in the context of a layered ontology. Modern philosophers make much use of 
these concepts in their treatment of the mind-body problem (Bunge, 1980; Sperry, 1991). 
However, emergentist philosophy did not come to maturity until the 1920s, at the very end of 
Veblen‟s life. 
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The importance of choice and intentionality in human affairs does not undermine the 
principle of evolutionary selection. Unlike Veblen, John R. Commons insisted that Darwinism 
was inappropriate for the understanding of socio-economic evolution, because humans made 
deliberate choices concerning socio-economic possibilities. Commons (1924, p. 376) thus 
wrote: „Economic phenomena … are the result of artificial selection and not of natural 
selection.‟ Commons (1934, pp. 45, 120, 636-8, 657-8, 713) persisted in his view that 
economic evolution involved „artificial selection‟ rather than „natural selection.‟ However, 
Darwin did not suggest that „artificial‟ and „natural‟ selection were mutually exclusive. 
Instead, examples of the former were used to support the idea of the latter. As Darwin‟s friend 
George Romanes (1893, 296) wrote in explaining Darwin‟s theory: „In a word, the proved 
capabilities of artificial selection furnish, in its best conceivable form, what is called an 
argument a fortiori in favour of natural selection.‟7 
4. Veblen’s Adoption of the Darwinian Principles of Variation and Inheritance 
Despite his extensive knowledge of biology, Veblen was too careful to commit himself in the 
then ongoing and unresolved debate over Lamarckism. Whether acquired characters could be 
inherited or not was in part an empirical question, to be answered by biological research. 
These issues were far from resolution in the biology of the 1890s and early 1900s; too little 
was understood of the mechanisms of genetic inheritance. Veblen did not wish to build his 
theory on what might be shifting scientific sands, and he took from Charles Darwin what he 
rightly regarded to be most decisive and enduring: the Darwinian principle of selection and 
the emphasis on causation. Veblen remained neutral on the question of whether or not 
acquired characters could be inherited. The outcome of this controversy did not affect key 
parts of his argument. Veblen (1899a, pp. 190, 192) thus wrote: 
For the present purpose, however, the question as to the nature of the adaptive process – 
whether it is chiefly a selection between stable types of temperament and character, or 
chiefly an adaptation of men‟s habits of thought to changing circumstances – is of less 
important than the fact that, by one method or another, institutions change and develop. 
… For the immediate purpose it need not be a question of serious importance whether 
this adaptive process is a process of selection and survival of persistent ethnic types or a 
process of individual adaptation and an inheritance of acquired traits. 
But while Veblen (1899a, p. 248) admitted the possibility that differences „in temperament 
may be due in part to a difference in the inheritance of acquired traits‟ he was not neutral 
between the theories of Darwin and Lamarck. Veblen (1904, p. 369) wrote: „Darwin set to 
work to explain species in terms of the process out of which they have arisen, rather than out 
of the prime cause to which the distinction between them may be due.‟ What Darwin had tried 
to do, albeit without complete success, was to provide a processual explanation of the origin 
of species where the causal mechanisms involved were fully specified. Veblen (1904, p. 369 
n.) continued in a highly perceptive footnote: „This is the substance of Darwin‟s advance over 
Lamarck, for instance.‟ On this basis of more adequate causal explanations of process, Veblen 
rightly judged Darwin to be superior to Lamarck. 
                                                 
7 I have criticised Commons‟s rejection of Darwinism elsewhere (Hodgson, 2002, 2004). At the time, Copeland 
(1936, pp. 343-4) pointed out that Commons‟s „artificial selection‟ of institutions depended on the prior „natural 
selection‟ of the guiding ethical or other principles that were used in the selecting process. Copeland‟s valid 
point was that the evolution of the criteria used in any „artificial‟ selection must also be explained. But Commons 
lacked even a rudimentary theory of what causes human motivation, action or choice. 
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Veblen understood that the process of Darwinian evolution had three important aspects. 
First, there must be sustained variation among the members of a species or population. 
Variations may be random or purposive in origin, but without them, as Darwin insisted, 
natural selection cannot operate. This is the concept of variation. Second, there must be some 
mechanism of heredity or continuity, through which offspring have to resemble their parents 
more than they resemble other members of their species. In other words, there has to be some 
mechanism through which individual characteristics are passed on through the generations. 
Third, natural selection itself operates either because better-adapted organisms leave increased 
numbers of offspring, or because the variations or gene combinations that are preserved are 
those bestowing advantage in struggling to survive. This is the concept of the struggle for 
existence. Consider these three features in turn, as they appear in Veblen‟s work. 
For Veblen (1900, p. 266) a Darwinian science must address „the conditions of variational 
growth‟. Veblen (1901b, p. 81) saw a „Darwinistic account‟ in economics as addressing „the 
origin, growth, persistence, and variation of institutions‟. Veblen (1899a, p. 217) also referred 
to „a selection between the predatory and the peaceable variants‟. This indicated that for 
Veblen, and in conformity with Darwin, variation exists prior to (as well as after) 
evolutionary selection.  
Veblen did not provide a full account of the sources of variation of social institutions. In 
general, Veblen (1909b, p. 628) saw cultural variation as cumulative: „The growth of culture 
is a cumulative sequence of habituation‟ but „each new move creates a new situation which 
induces a further new variation in the habitual manner of response‟ and „each new situation is 
a variation of what has gone before and embodies as causal factors all that has been effected 
by what went before‟. 
For Veblen, the „instinctive propensity‟ of „idle curiosity‟ was also a major ongoing source 
of variety and invention. „This instinctive curiosity‟ may „accelerate the gain in technological 
insight‟ as well as „persistently disturbing the habitual body of knowledge‟ (Veblen, 1914, p. 
87). Note here that Veblen was again disposed to bring in an instinctive explanation of social 
outcomes. Especially to the modern reader, this is not so convincing. But the validity or 
otherwise of this point should be a matter not of prejudice against the concept of instinct but 
of scientific investigation.8 
Veblen also used the metaphor of mutation, applying it to social and economic institutions. 
In 1901 the Dutch biologist Hugo De Vries published Die mutationstheorie in German. It 
noted the forgotten genetic discoveries of Gregor Mendel and proposed his own „mutation 
theory‟. The rediscovery of Mendelian genetics eventually led to the modern neo-Darwinian 
synthesis in biology and the victory of the Darwinians over the Lamarckians. But this did not 
occur until the 1940s, long after Veblen‟s death. In 1910 Veblen started work on a paper that 
explicitly incorporated some of De Vries‟s ideas.9 
The first appearances of the use of the term „mutation‟ in an institutional context in 
Veblen‟s writings are „business capital and its mutations‟ (Veblen, 1904, p. 149), „effects of 
these institutions and of the mutations they undergo‟ and „growth and mutations of the 
institutional fabric‟ (Veblen, 1909b, pp. 627-9). Much later Veblen (1919b, pp. 5, 40) wrote 
                                                 
8 One of the earliest references to „idle curiosity‟ is in Veblen (1906, p. 590). 
9 Dorfman (1934, p. 295). This paper was published three years later (Veblen, 1913). 
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of „the mutation of habits‟ and proposed that „the state of the industrial arts has been 
undergoing a change of type, such as followers of Mendel would call a “mutation”‟.10 
We now turn to the second Darwinian concept, the question of inheritance. It is clear from 
the Leisure Class that the institution was regarded as the unit of relative stability and 
continuity through time, ensuring that much of the pattern and variety is passed on from one 
period to the next. Veblen (1899a, p. 191) wrote: 
Institutions are products of the past process, are adapted to past circumstances, and are 
therefore never in full accord with the requirements of the present. … At the same time, 
men‟s present habits of thought tend to persist indefinitely, except as circumstances 
enforce a change. These institutions which have so been handed down, these habits of 
thought, points of view, mental attitudes and aptitudes, or what not, are therefore 
themselves a conservative factor. This is the factor of social inertia, psychological inertia, 
conservatism. 
This relative stability and durability of habits and institutions made them key objects of 
evolutionary selection in the socio-economic sphere. But Veblen did not examine the 
processes or institutional replication or inheritance in sufficient detail. 
5. Veblen and Darwinian Selection 
Turning to the concept of selection, Veblen (1899a, p. 188) famously promoted the idea that 
in social evolution there was a „natural selection of institutions‟: 
The life of man in society, just like the life of other species, is a struggle for existence, 
and therefore it is a process of selective adaptation. The evolution of social structure has 
been a process of natural selection of institutions. The progress which has been and is 
being made in human institutions and in human character may be set down, broadly, to a 
natural selection of the fittest habits of thought and to a process of enforced adaptation of 
individuals to an environment which has progressively changed with the growth of 
community and with the changing institutions under which men have lived. Institutions 
are not only themselves the result of a selective and adaptive process which shapes the 
prevailing or dominant types of spiritual attitude and aptitudes; they are at the same time 
special methods of life and human relations, and are therefore in their turn efficient 
factors of selection. So that the changing institutions in their turn make for a further 
selection of individuals endowed with the fittest temperament, and a further adaptation of 
individual temperament and habits to the changing environment through the formation of 
new institutions. 
It was no accident that Darwin‟s phrases „natural selection‟ and „struggle for existence‟ 
appeared here. Veblen (1899a, p. 207) wrote also in the same work of „the law of natural 
selection, as applied to human institutions‟. Elsewhere Veblen (1898c, p. 188; 1900, pp. 241, 
261, 217; 1906, p. 589) poignantly but infrequently applied the specific phrase „natural 
selection‟ to habits of thought or to social institutions. The decisive implication was that 
Darwinism could be applied to human society without necessarily reducing explanations of 
social phenomena entirely to individual psychology or biology. 
                                                 
10 Veblen (1914, pp. 16-18, 21-5, 69, 140; 1915, pp. 277-8; 1925, p. 51) repeatedly referred to Mendelian 
genetics in his later works. 
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Although Veblen used the phrase „natural selection‟ only a few times, the concept of 
selection is common and persistent in his works. Words such as „select‟, „selection‟ and 
„selective‟, used in the Darwinian sense of a process of sifting and preservation of fortuitous 
adaptations, are used with conspicuous frequency. I have counted well over a hundred 
appearances. A large number of these appearances concern the selection of institutions, 
customs or habits of thought. Confining ourselves to the Leisure Class (Veblen, 1899a) alone, 
the following examples are a small sample: 
In whatever way usages and customs and methods of expenditure arise, they are all 
subject to the selective action of this norm of reputability; and the degree in which they 
conform to its requirements is a test of their fitness to survive in the competition with 
other similar usages and canons. (p. 166) 
There is a cumulative growth of customs and habits of thought; a selective adaptation of 
conventions and methods of life. (p. 208) 
Social evolution is a process of selective adaptation of temperament and habits of thought 
under the stress of the circumstances of associated life. The adaptation of habits of 
thought is the growth of institutions. ... a process of selection ... a selective process ... (pp. 
213-4) 
Wherever the pecuniary culture prevails, the selective process by which men‟s habits of 
thought are shaped, and by which the survival of rival lines of descent is decided, 
proceeds proximately on the basis of fitness for acquisition. (p. 241) 
This and much other textual evidence on his use of the concept of selection, along with his 
understanding of the importance of variation and inheritance in the Darwinian theory, 
decisively favours an interpretation of Veblen‟s work as one in which Darwinian principles 
are applied to the analysis of social evolution.  
It must again be emphasized that Veblen‟s Darwinian economics did not involve the 
assertion that economic evolution can or must be reduced substantially to biological terms. 
Furthermore, Veblen‟s use of Darwinian terminology was not confined to metaphor. Veblen 
made it abundantly clear that he believed that socio-economic systems actually evolved in a 
manner consistent with the Darwinian concepts of variation, inheritance and selection. Veblen 
did not believe that the application of Darwinian theory was confined to nature. In his social 
theory, his use of Darwinian theory was much more than mere word play. The difference 
between natural and social evolution was in the units of selection and in the details of the 
evolutionary processes, not in the exclusion of variation, inheritance or selection from the 
social sphere. Variation, inheritance and selection are present and real in both the social and 
the natural context.11 
The relatively infrequent appearance of the phrase „natural selection‟ does not undermine 
the claim that Veblen was an evolutionary economist in a Darwinian genre. As mentioned 
above, he used the concept of selection frequently. But it remains to consider why Veblen did 
not often choose to attach the adjective „natural‟ to the abundant instances of „selection‟ or 
„selection process‟ in his work. We may guess why. First, and most obviously, Veblen was 
concerned with the evolution of society, and not of the non-human, natural world. As his 
attention was directed at society rather than nature, the term „natural‟ was dropped. Second, 
                                                 
11 For discussions of the Darwinian character of Veblen‟s work see Harris (1934), Daugert (1950), Hill (1958), 
Murphree (1959), Russett (1976), Dugger, (1984), Edgell and Tilman (1989), Tilman (1992, 1996) and many 
others. See Jennings and Waller (1998) for a contrary but unconvincing view. 
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the „natural selection‟ of institutions could be misinterpreted by the reader in terms of „nature‟ 
doing the selecting, or that the selection was taking place according to „natural‟ rather than 
economic or other social criteria. Third, economists and others who advocated a „natural‟ 
order, or „natural rights‟, were the persistent objects of Veblen‟s (1899b; 1901a; 1908; 1914, 
pp. 258-60, 289-98, 340-3) devastating criticism. Resistance to the likely interpretations of the 
word „natural‟ as „normal‟ or „predestined‟ could have led to the rejection of the term, 
especially when the word „selection‟ on its own would do. Hence there are several possible 
reasons why Veblen more frequently used the word „selection‟ rather than „natural selection‟. 
As a result, the marginalization of the word „natural‟ in his writing should not be taken to 
imply that Veblen lost any of his Darwinian inspiration.12 
Incidentally, for different reasons, Darwin himself was uneasy about the phrase „natural 
selection‟. It was suggested to him that the word „selection‟ invoked the image of „nature‟s 
Guiding Hand‟, or even one of God being the selector. Darwin thus conceded: „I suppose 
“natural selection” was a bad term‟ (Desmond and Moore, 1991, pp. 458, 492). For this 
reason Darwin sometimes used the words „descent with modification‟ instead. He ultimately 
preferred the term „natural preservation‟ (Ruse, 1979, p. 208). Both Darwin and Veblen were 
hesitant about the use of the term „natural selection‟ but for different reasons. Darwin 
cultivated the word „natural‟ and Veblen economized and used the word „selection‟ alone. 
While Veblen generally saw institutions as units of selection in a process of economic 
evolution, he did not make the context, criteria or mechanisms of selection entirely clear. 
Prompted by the notion that the social „environment‟ itself evolves, Veblen (1899a, pp. 188-
98) moved towards, but did not complete, a causal analysis of that evolutionary process. 
Insofar as an evolutionary analysis exists, we have to impute it from passages such as the one 
quoted above, where Veblen (1899a, p. 191) wrote that the „selective adaptation can never 
catch up with the progressively changing situation in which the community finds itself at any 
given time‟. This suggests a process of imperfect institutional adjustment and cultural lag. But 
it does not sufficiently explain the evolution of the „progressively changing situation‟ in 
which institutions are selected. 
6. Conclusion: Success and Failure in Veblen’s Darwinism 
Nevertheless, Veblen was clearly attempting to move towards a theory of institutional 
evolution. In its time and context, this sketchy and preliminary analysis of institutional 
evolution in the Leisure Class was a major achievement, standing significantly above such 
precursors as those of Bagehot, Ritchie and others. Having started this research programme, 
however, he failed to move it forward (Rutherford, 1998). Cynthia Russett‟s (1976, p. 153) 
verdict was apposite and accurate: 
If Veblen failed to develop an evolutionary methodology, he also failed to develop a 
comprehensive evolutionary theory to explain in detail how institutions evolve in the 
cultural environment and what sorts of interaction occur between economic activity and 
                                                 
12 Dobriansky‟s (1957) critique of Veblen failed to appreciate Darwinism. For example, Dobriansky (1957, p. 
93) falsely upheld that natural selection implied both uniformity and finality, entirely contrary to its true meaning 
in terms of variety and process. Dobriansky grasped neither the philosophical significance of Darwinism nor its 
central place in Veblen‟s thought. Not uniquely, a critic thought he was attacking Veblen; but the critique carries 
more weight against the self-described „Veblenians‟. Daugert (1950) is superior and more accurate in its 
philosophical treatment of Veblen. 
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institutional structures. Veblen was something of an intellectual butterfly, and he often 
lacked the patience to elaborate his ideas into a coherent system. But he teemed with 
fragmentary insights, and these can be pieced together to suggest the outlines of a 
Veblenian scheme of cultural evolution – what might be called a „pre-theory‟ of cultural 
change. 
We may conjecture on the reasons for Veblen‟s failure to develop a systematic evolutionary 
theory. In part they were probably due to difficulties in his personal and professional life 
(Jorgensen and Jorgensen, 1999). It is also evident that Veblen had no strong disposition 
towards the task of systematic theoretical development. But it also should be emphasized that 
Veblen was writing in an era when core Darwinian ideas were rarely understood, and they had 
not yet been fully systematized by other theorists. We had to wait for developments as late as 
the 1980s and 1990s, particularly in the philosophy of biology, for the clarification of key 
concepts such as selection, replication, and multiple-level evolution. Hence if we put Veblen‟s 
writings in their context and proper perspective, he emerges as a pioneer of a theoretical 
approach to the understanding of socio-economic evolution that is only beginning to be 
adequately formulated today. 
A vital task for the social sciences is to come to grips with the nature and importance of 
Darwinism. Above all, Darwinism is a new philosophical system, signalling an unwavering 
commitment to causal explanation. It involves algorithmic explanations of process, rather than 
an exclusive focus on the properties of equilibria. Darwinism offers a vital meta-theoretical 
framework to understand all complex, evolving systems (Hodgson, 2004). Within this 
framework it is necessary to place additional theoretical explanations that are particular to the 
types of human and social phenomena at hand (Hodgson, 2001a). But without the over-
arching Darwinian framework we are either lost in a sea of detail or forced into a static or 
equilibrium analysis. Veblen was one of the first to apply this framework to social institutions 
and structures, and we must build up the positive parts of his Darwinian legacy. 
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